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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FLOYD HARMER, STANLEY D. ROBER TS, G. MARION HINCKLEY, as the
Board of County Commissioners for Utah
County, and as the County Board of Equalization, and as individual taxpayers in Utah
County; HARRISON CONOVER, as Utah
County Assessor; ELWOOD L. SUNDBERG, as Utah County Auditor; MAURICE C. BIRD as Utah County Treasurer;
C. STEVEN HATCH, as a resident and
taxpayer of Utah County,

-vs. -

Plaintiffs, Appellants and
Cross-Respondents,

/\

Case
No. 11369

)j,

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant, Respondent and
Cross-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE TAX COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appella11ts' factual recitation is excerpted from the
formal judgment of the lower court, and is thus ipso
facto immune from any criticism on the grounds that it
distorts such judgment. As we noted in the initial
hricf, howenr, it is the belief of respondent State Tax
1

Commission that the formal judgment of the court is
itself distortive, particularly in its omission of numerous relevant facts related to average assessment ]evels,
the default of county assessors, etc.
It is distortive in another way as well; the ]o"·cr
court's opinion, as set forth in a memorandum decision
(R. 145-153) prepared by the court, was partially in
favor of plaintiffs and partially in favor of defendant
(appellants' brief, page 2; respondent's initial brief,
page 2). But the formal judgment prepared by counsel for appellants does not reflect in a just and balanced
manner this memorandum decision, but rather emphasizes and affectionately expands those parts of the memorandum decision most favorable to appellants and denigrates, emasculates, and sometimes blithely ignores those
parts of the same memorandum decision favorable to respondent.
It is the sincere belief of respondent that the memo-

randum decision itself, and the extensive factual narrative set forth in the perior brief of respondent, more fully
set forth the salient facts in this controversy, and set
them forth with a fairer emphasis, than the findings of
fact quoted in appellants' brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH
IS A CONSTITUTIONAL BODY, CHARGED
GENERALLY WITH THE ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF TAXATION
LAWS IN THIS STATE, AND SPECIFI2

CALLY GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
SUPERVISING LOCAL TAX OFFICIALS
AND EQUALIZING ASSESSMENTS BOTH
AMONG AND WITHIN THE SEVERAL
COUNTIES TO INSURE EQUALITY AND
UNIFORMITY THROUGHOUT THE STATE.
The lower court correctly ruled that the State Tax
Commission (hereafter referred to as the "Commission'') has broad supervisory powers over county
tax officials, including the power to equalize assessments
within the Yarious counties. Indeed, the constitutional
and statutory provisions setting forth the powers of the
Commission and defining its relationship with these local
officials are unequivocal to the degree that a contrary ruling would have been inconceivable.
The controlling constitutional provision is set forth
in the brief of appellants (pp. 9-10) and here restated for
the convenience of the court:
There shall be State Tax Commission consisting
of four members, not more than two of whom shall
belong to the same political party. The members
of the Commission shall be appointed by the Governor, by and with the consent of the Senate, for
such terms of office as may be provided by law.
The State Tax Commission shall administer and
superrise the tax laws of the State. It shall assess
mines and public utilities and adjust and equalize
the valuation and assessment of property among
the several counties. It shall have such other powers of original assessment as the Legislature
may provide. Under such limitations as the Legislature may prescribe, it shall establish systems
a/ public accounting, review proposed bond issues,
renisc the tax levies and biidgets of local govern3

mental units, and equalize the assessment and 1,'aluation of property within the cnunties. The duties
imposed upon the State Board of Equalization
by the Constitution and Laws of this Sta.fe shall
be performed by the State Tax Commission.

In each county of this State there shall he a Comity Board of Equalization co11sisting of the Bonnl
of County Commissioners of said county. T71e
County Boa,rds of Equalizalion shall adjust and
equalize the 1,azuation and assessment of the real
and personal vroperty within their respectire
counties, subject to such regulation and control by
the State Tax Commission as may be prescribed
by law. The State Tax Commission and the County Boards of Equalization shall each have such
other powers as may be prescribed by the Leg-islature. (Emphasis supplied.) Utah Const., art.
XIII, ~ 11.
Thus, the Constitution specifically and ·without
equivocation grants the State Tax Commission general
powers to equalize within the various counties, as well as
among these counties, and this right is to be exercisN1
freely, and to be limited only by legislative restriction.
The implementing legislation 1 does not limit this power
hut simply further defines it and sets forth procedures
(usually in terms of broad outlines) through which it is
to be exercised:
Section 59-5-46. The powers and duties of the
state tax commission are as follows:
(3) To prescribe such rules and regulations as
1 We feel that the convenience of the court might best be served by a
complete listing of pertinent statutory provisions, and beg the court's in
dulgence in this uninterrupted and somewhat lengthy recitation of statuton
Jaw.
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it may deem necessary, not in conflict with the
Constitution and laws of the state, to govern county boards and officers in the performance of arny
duty it& con1iection with assessment, equalization
and collection of general taxes.
(9) To have and exercise general supervision
over the administration of the tax laws of the
state, o /)Cr assessors and over county boards in
the performance of their duties as county boards
of equalization and over other county officers i111
the performance of their duties in comiection with
assessment of property and collection of taxes, to
the end that all assessments of property be ma,de
just and equal, at true i·alue, and that the tax
burden may be distributed without favor or discrimination.
(11) To confer icith, advise and direct county
treasurers and assessors in matters relating to
the assessment and equalization of property for
taxation and the collection of taxes ...

(14) To direct proceedings, actions and prosecutions to enforce the laws relating to the penalties,
liabilities and punishments of public officers, persons a1id officers or agents of corporations for
failure or neglect to comply with the provisions
of the statutes go1 erning the return, assessment
and taxation of property;
1

(18) To risit, as a board or by individual members thereof, annually, and oftener if deemed ncccessary, each county of the state for the investigation a11d direction of the il'ork and methods of local assessors and other officials in the assessment,
equalization and taxation of property, and to ascertain 11'l1ether the provisions of law reqniring
5

the assessment of all property, not exernpt from
tarxation, and the collection of taxes have bee11
properly administered and enforced.

(19) To examine carefully into all cases 11,liere
evasion or violation of the laws for assessment
aqzd taxation of property is alleged, complained
of or discovered, and to ascertain wherein existing laws are defective or are improperly or negligently administered.
(23) To . . . exercise all powers necessary in the
perf orrnance of its duties.
Section 59-5-47. The state tax commission shall
adjust and equalize the valuation of the taxable
property in the several counties of the state for
the purpose of taxation; and to that encl it may
of its own initiative order or make an assessrn.ent
or reassessrnent of any property which it deems
to have been overassessed or underassessed or
which it finds has not been assessed.
Finally, Section 59-7-13 provides:
Each year the state tax commission shall conduct
an investigation throughout each county of the
state to determine whether all property subject to
taxation is on the assessment rolls, and whether
such property is being assessed at thirty per ce11t
of its reasonable fair cash value. When, after
any such investigation, it is found that any
property which is subject to taxation is not
assessed, then the state tax commission shall direct the county assessor, the county board of
equalization or the county auditor as it may
determine to enter the assessment of s11rli
escaped property. If it is found that an:»
property in any county is not being assessed
at thirty percent of its reasonable fair cash
6

,·alue, the state tax commission shall, for
the purpose of equalizing the vRlue of property in
the state, increase or decrease the assessed valuation of such property in order to enforce the assessment of all property subject to taxation upon
the basis of thirty per cent of its reasonable fair
cash value, and shall direct the county assessor,
the county board of equalization or the county auditor, as it may determine, to correct the assessed
rnluation of such property in the manner 'which
the state tax commission shall prescribe. The
county assessors, county boards of equalization
and county auditors shall make such increases or
decreases as may be required by the state tax
commission to make the assessment of all property within the county conform as nearly as may
be to thirty per cent of the reasonable fair cash
\'alue.
(All emphasis supplied.)
vVe would respectfully urge that all of the statutory
provisions just quoted are reasonable, proper, within
tlie constitutional mandate and, as will subsequently appear, also necessary and desirable.
Appellants rely on two antiquated cases in their
coutcntion that the Commission power to supervise
county officials is limited to equalization among the various counties and does not extend to equalizing values
within these counties. Salt Lake City v. Armstrong,
1:J Utah 172, 49 Pac. 641 (1896); State ex rel Cunmingliam v. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 50 Pac. 615 (1897). This reliance is ill adYised, since these cases are no longer good
law, heing a construction not of the current constitutional language but of constitutional language which was

7

discarded by the people of this state in 1930.
XIII, § 11, read as follows prior to 1930:

Article

Until otherwise provided by law, there shall be a
State Board of Equalization, consisting of the
Governor, State Auditor, State Treasurer, Secretary of State and Attorney-General; also, iu
c•ach county of this State, a county board of
equalization, consisting of the board of county
commissioners of said county. The duty of the
State Board of Equalization shall be to adjust
and equalize the valuation of the real and personal property among the several counties of the
State. The duty of the county board of equalization shall be to adjust and equalize the valuation of the real and personal property within their
respective counties. Each board shall also perform such other duties as may be prescribed hy
law. (Emphasis supplied.)
As is obvious from a perusal of this and the current
constitutional language, it was through enactment of
the current provision that the State Tax Commission
as no>v structured came into existence. The date
of its birth was January 1, 1931, and the enabling
amendment was proposed pursuant to a study made by a
tax revision commission consisting of S. R. Thurman,
W. ·w. Armstrong, and R. E. Hammond. The Tax Revision Commission felt that the creation of a full-time
tax commission would lead to the modernization of antiquated tax administrative structures and procedures, and
would assure equity and uniformity in administration
amongst all citizens of the state. Report of the Tax
Revision Commission of the State of Utah (1929).
The amendment of the constitution amounted to a
8

(·oui::ltitutional reversal of the decisions relied upon by a ppellauts, and a statement by the electorate of this state
to the effect that the Commission vrns to have broader
equalization powers than did the old State Board of
~qnalization. The cases are thus not only rendered
meaningless, based as they are on premises no longer
r<ilid, but specifically repudiated. There is no case in
Ptah postdating 1930 which can reasonably be construed
to (le11y or, in any meaningful sense limit, the power of
the State Tax Commission to equalize assessments within the ·nuious counties as well as among them.
The one modern (i.e., post 1930) case cited by appellallts is Unii·ersity Ff eights, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n.,
l~ Utah 2d 196, 364 P .2d 661 ( 1961). This case held that
the State Tax Commission, in determining the corporate
franchise tax of a corporation pursuant to the alternative method set forth in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
·~· 39-13-3 (1963), need not use an appropriate multiple
of the assessed valuation of the property of this cor1nratio11 made for ad valorem tax purposes, but may
make its own independent investigation and judgment as
to the value of that property. The decision makes certnin gc•neral references in dicta to the supervisory powers of the Tax Commission over county assessors and
states that local assessment is primarily a function of a
c:onnty assessor, and the legislature obviously intended
tliat the Tax Commission would not usurp this function
llH\'C in exceptional circumstances.
It does not say that
the county assessor performs his duties without being re::ipousible to the State Tax Commission, but rather states
prc•C'isely tlie contrary. The case makes no reference
9

whatsoever to county boards of equalization. To suggest, as counsel for plaintiff has done, that this case
stands for the proposition that the Commission cannot
correct errors made by a county board of equalization
when it discovers them, or modifies the power granted
to the Commission in the quoted constitutional and statutory provisions, is indeed a most tortured construrtion.
There is one post 1931 case which does have precedential value, however. In County Board of Equalization of Kane County v. State Tax Comni'n of Utah, 88
Utah 219, 50 P.2d 418 (1935), this honorable court held:

Since the commission has general supervision
over the taa; l(JJU)s of the state and over those
charged with the enforcement of those laws, and
has the power on appeal to make such correction
or change in the order of the county board of
equalization as it may deem proper, it must neressarily follow tha.t it is authorized to cancel, racate, or change as assessment when, upon a proper showing, it has been determined that the assessment shou1d be so cancelled, vacated, or changed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It must indeed necessarily follow.

An inquiry into case law from other jurisdictions is
not rewarding because of variation in constitutional language. A few cases may have limited value by way of
analogy. For example, Bank of Carthage v. Thomas, 330
Mo. 19, 48 S.W.2d 930 (1932), upheld an increase of
48.33% in personal property valuations made by the
state board in overruling a county board, and based thiR
10

]1() lcling in large part on simple recognition of the state's
:-;uperior authority.

ht most jurisdictions, the State Tax Commission, or
comparable agency under another name, is given
hroad supervisory and equalization powers not unlike
those granted our own. For example, the authority of
the Arizona Commission has been described in this
manner:

The State Tax Commission in its capacity as
State Board of Equalization is invested with the
duty to equalize the valuations and assessment of
property through the state. Its power of equalization is practically unlimited. To that end it may
equalize the assessment of all property between
persons of the same assessment district, between
cities and towns in the same county, and between
different counties of the state and the property
assessed by the commission in the first instance.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Cochise County, 92 Ariz.
395, 377 P.2d 770 (1963).
Counsel for plaintiffs urges that an adoption of the
po:-;ition of defendant would lead to an emasculation of
county boards of equalization. We respectfully suggest
that this is analagous to claiming that the establishment
of an effective appellate system deprives trial courts of
thrir authority and meaning. Respondent supports the
(·011eept of viable county boards, acting dynamically in
fnll exercise of their powers. They are in no sense superfluous but have a significant role in tax administration.
1'lic fact that they are supervised by the tax commission
does not take away their authority but rather insures
proper exercise of it. The Commission, in turn, has
11

checks on its exercise of granted powers m the legislative and judiciary. If a county board feels that actions
or orders of the Commission are unlawful or unfair, it
can (as has happened in the instant case) petition for
judicial review.
Typically (in this jurisdiction as ~well as else when•)
decisions of county boards of equalization acting withill
the sphere of their authority are left undisturbed. It
is only in unusual situations, such as in the present problem, where a county board refuses to implement a lawful directive given to it by the tax commission or, also
as in this case, purportedly acts but acts i1ffalidly due to
failure to adhere to controlling substantive and procedural law, that the state supervisory taxing authorit)takes steps to reverse or correct action of county hoards,
beyond responding to routine appeals.
County boards of equalization exercising their appointed powers are necessary to proper tax administration in Utah. Equally necessary is a broad supen-isory
power in the Utah State Tax Commission, specifically including the power to review vamation and assessments of
property within the various counties. We respectfully
submit that the tax commission does have this power,
and that it makes no difference whether this power is exercised in relation to a single piece of property or 700.

12

POINT lI
ONLY THROUGH SUPERVISION OF LOCAL
TAXING OFFICIALS BY THE STATE TAX
COMMISSION, AND THE EXERCISE BY
THE COl\fI\IISSION OF BROAD CORRECTIVE POWERS, CAN EFFICIENT AND
J~QUITABLE TAX ADMINISTRATION
THROUGHOUT THE STATE BE ASSURED,
AND rrHOSE SECTIONS OF UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW WHICH
PROVIDE THEREFORE ARE CONSISTENT
-WITH LOGIC, EQUITY AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST.
Appellants apparently envision the State Tax Commission functioning vis-a-vis county tax officials in a
luofidy correlative, speak-when-you-are-spoken-to kind of
rnlc, and regard anything further as unpalatable interference. In Point I, we have determined that this is not
the role envisioned by the framers of the Constitution
nml the duly elected legislators of this state for the Commission, and in this point we will explore several policy
rPaso11s why the relationship established by these bodies
to govern interaction of state and county tax officials is
not onl:r workable but, indeed, the only just and proper
relationship which might exist.
There are a number of reasons why this is so. First, it
i:-s [l ]mndantly clear that county governments do not have,
aml because of severe manpower and monetary limitaticms cannot have, assessor's offices staffed by qualified
c•xpcrts. This problem exists throughout the country,
a11d the testimony of Guy Ivins, Harrison Conover and
Da,"i<l Burton bears eloquent witness to the existence in

13

spades of these problems in this jurisdiction. Only on
the state level can persons with experience and expertise
be compensated roughly consistent with their abilities,
and others trained to arrive at the same degree of expertise and experience. If every county were required to
"go it alone" without the assistance of these competent
state employees, which assistance is invariably readily
extended, the situation would be considerably worse than
at present.
One reason this training and expenence prohlem is so significant, here as elsewhere, is that assessorB
are elected, rather than appointed, and anyone at all
can run for the office. Untrained and inexperienced personnel cannot help but make errors in their work and
without a centralized state agency to advise and teach,
and correct errors when necessa.ry, total chaos would soon
result.
Further, and more importantly, only through a centralized equalization agency exercising considerable powers can uniformity and equality of assessment throughout
the state be assured. It is clear that an intrinsic safeguard operates with some effectiveness in cases of discriminatory valuation or assessment between taxpayers
in the same county. If the property of X is valued or
assessed at a higher percentage of its fair cash value
than the property of his neighbor Y, X may seek relief
through the designated administrative process or through
institution of legal proceedings. If X is sufficiently informed and sufficiently enraged, he will seek such relief. This safeguard, however, is totally inoperative in
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t 11e case of a systematic undervaluation or underassess-

mt•11t within a county. If everyone's valuations or assessments are kept low or even lowered, no one complains and everyone votes for good old whoever is able
to take the credit for the bonanza. In this type of sitnation, which is far from uncommon (see Point IV, respomlent 's initial brief), the need for a centralized state
agency with power to assume original jurisdiction to
right whatever wrongs exist becomes strikingly apparent.
Where there is a wrong, the law contemplates the existence of a remedy.
'l'hese hypothetical considerations become very connete when explored in the frame of reference of a statewide levy, such as the uniform school fund provided for
in Utah Const. art. X ~ 3 and Title 53, Ch. 7, Utah Code
A1motated. Max H. Kerr, director of the property tax
division of the Utah State Tax Commission, testified
(Tr. 155-181) as to the mechanics of how a state-wide
levy is set and how tax monies flow into a centralized pool
for subsequent distribution based on need determined
aecording to specific statutory standards. He testified
further that there were in fact three levies for educational purposes: a 16-mill levy for what was designated
as the basic program, a 12-mill levy for the state-supported leeway program, both of which are set, and the uniform school fund levy which varies yearly. In 1967, it
was 7.3 mills. A county must exact both the 16- and 12mill levies to participate in the uniform school fund prog-ram, and in 1967 all counties did. The three combined
total 33.3 mills, a considerable levy, and since a subRtantial percentage of ad valorem taxes go into this fund,
15

the reduction of assessments in one county has impact
in all counties. Suppose, for example, that in County X
the county board of equalization arbitrarily reduced all
valuations for assessment purposes by fifty percent. In
all likelihood, no resident of the county \voulcl we or otlterwi se challenge such a beneficient action. The eo1111ty
would then make the required levies, taxes would go into
the uniform school fund, the county would be entitled to
draw therefrom, and (assuming other counties or most
other counties attempted proper assessment) the schools
in County X will receive financial benefits far in excess
of contributions made by residents thereof, and far in excess of what they are justly entitled to.
Since the reduction of assessments in any county,
therefore, affects taxpayers in other counties by requiring them to pay a disproportionate share of the school
support monies, assessments can be wrongfully kept low
with only a nominal loss in revenues availability. It
follows inevitably that the uniform school fund can only
be equitably and properly administered if assessment
levels are roughly uniform throughout the state, and this
uniformity can be assured only by a state agency with
broad powers of review and adjustment of county equalization actions. Mr. Kerr, in association with the uniform
school fund for well over a decade, and a recognized authority in the ar<'a, corroborated these conclusions with
his expert opinion.
The same principles are applicable, of course, to all
other statewide levies as well as the uniform school fund,
which has been examined in some detail because it is a
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prototype and because it is at the present time, in terms
of dollars invoked, easily the most significant state-wide
kYy.

Another compelling reason \Yhy state-wide equalization is required is that local tax officials are under con·"idcrable pressures to keep taxes low because of political
"t re8s. The framers and amenders of our constitution
recognized clearly the strengths and weaknesses of local
tax administrators, which are axiomatic. Their great
'irtue is that they are close to the people, aware of local
r•conomic and political changes, often familiar even with
pnrticular properties, and are, thus, in an especially appropriate position to make equalization adjustments in
tlir interests of equity and fairness. The negative side
t:f the coin is that this very closeness subjects them to
rnricd emotional, social, and political pressures which
sometimes distort perspective. A central state authority,
more removed, is less subject to these. Local pressures
corniistently are in one direction, toward reduction of asst>:ssments and taxes. If history teaches us anything, it
is that the human animal generally does not like to pay
taxes m1d that a heavy tax burden, and particularly a
~l1arp increase in tax burden, can lead directly to lost
elections. These problems were explored in considerable
rldail in Point IV of the initial brief :filed by respondent.
These truths are manifest in this jurisdiction as well
as almost all others. State-assessed property is close to
il1c statutory standard, locally-assessed property dramatically lower.
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This system of intergovernmental administrative
check and balance was conceived to solve (and works well
in solving) concrete problems to insure compliance with
the mandate of this honorable Court to the effect that it
is "self-evident" that "no tax is legal" which is not
''equally and impartially laid on the taxpayer'' and
"honest and responsible in its administration" and secures "these conditions to the taxpayer in particular
and to the public in general." Kerr v. Woolley, 3 Utah
456, 24 Pac. 831 ( 1866).
The problems above described are not creations of
the plaintiffs; rather, the difficulties are built in. In reeognition of these and related problems, the framerB and
amenders of our constitution and our representatives
in the legislature have wisely created a central administrative body and clothed it with broad quasi-legislative
authority. It is significant that just about all disinterested property tax experts favor centralized, technically
proficient state tax authority with considerable authority
over local assessments and equalization. 2
POINT III
THROUGHOUT THIS CONTROVERSY, 'rHE
STATE TAX COMMISSION ACTED IN ACCORDANCE -WITH CONTROLLING LAW IN
DISCHARGE OF ITS SUPERVISORY AND
EQUALIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT
THE PURPORTED ADJUSTMENTS MADE
2See, for example, Morrill, Denis R., ProfH:rty Tax Asseessment and the
Utah Constitution - A TaxPa)•er's Dilemma, in Utah Law Review (Vol. 1966

- No. 2.)
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BY THE COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION ARE IN PART INVALID BECAUSE OF
PROCEDURAL ERROR.
Si11ce supervisory powers of the State Tax Commission over county tax officials have been set forth, it is
uow appropriate to inquire as to whether or not these
powers were properly exercised. The propriety of exercise i11 relation to the actual reassessment in Provo and
Orem was examined in some detail in respondent's initial brief, and such examination will not be repeated. We
respectfully submit that the Commission's actions during
the entire course of this reassessment were proper and
wilhin its delegated powers.
-,Ne shall at this juncture examine the actions of the
county and state authorities in the hearings which followed the appraisals and mailing of the notices of asHessmen t. It is the position of respondent (set forth in
Point V of the initial brief without commentary or argument) that the Commission's actions are sustainable,
hut that those of the County Board of Equalization must
be struck down in part because of procedural error and
also because of abandonment of constitutional and statutory valuation standards (discussed in Point IV infra).
Section 59-7-1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended
( l~IG3), dealing with the powers and procedures of County Boards of Equalization, provides in pertinent part:
The board of county commissioners is the county
board of equalization and must meet on the 31st
tlay of May in each year to examine the assessmeut books and equalize the assessment of prop19

erty in the county, including the assessment for
general taxes of all cities and towns situateu
therein. It must continue in session for the purpose from time to time until the business of equalizing is disposed of, but not later than the 20th
day of June, except as otherwise provided. All
complaints regarding the assessment nf property
'Where notice of the decision of the county hoanl
of equalization thereon has not been gi\'ell to the
taxpayer on or prior to June 20, and all such complaints not disposed of or decided by sai(l board
on or prior to said date shall be deemed to haw
been denied on said date and no notice of such
denial need be given.
Section 59-5-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, setting
forth a procedure for State Tax Commission reassessments, provides:
The state tax commission shall adjust and equalize the valuation of the taxable property in the
several counties of the state for the purpose of
taxation; and to that end it may of its own initiative order or make an assessment or reassessment of any property ·which it deems to have been
overassessecl or underassessed or which it finds
has not been assessed. In the event the commission shall intend to make an assessment or reassessment under this section, notice thereof and of
the time and place fixed by it for the determination
of such assessment shall be given by the commission, by letter deposited in the post office at least
fifteen days before the date so fixed, to the owner
of such property and to the auditor of the county in
which such property is situated. Upon the elate
so fixed the state tax commission shall assess or
reassess such property and shall notify the county auditor of the assessment made, and every such
assessment shall have the same force and effect as
20

if made by the county assessor before the delivery of the assessment book to the county treasurer. The county auditor shall record said assessment upon the assessment books in the same manner as is provided in section 59-7-9 in the case of a
correction made by the county board of equalization, and no county board of equalization or assessor shall have any power to change any assessment so fixed by the state tax commission. All
hearings had upon assessments made or ordered
by the state tax commission pursuant to this section shall be held in the county in which the property involved is situated. One or more members
of the tax commission may conduct such hearing,
and any assessment made after a hearing before
any number of the members of the tax commission shall be as valid as if made after a hearing
before the full commission.

It is to be initially noted that the language in both of
the controlling statutory provisions appears to be mandatory, and nothing in their ·wording would suggest that
one might be interpreted to be permissive and the other
not. Nonetheless, this is exactly what happened in the
lower court. Before this contradiction is further explorc<l, it would not be inappropriate to separately look
at the impact on this problem of the two statutes, each in
its own context.
It is clear that the Utah County Board of Equalization was asked to deal with a quantity of requests for
equalization far beyond what it had dealt with in previous years, and perhaps beyond as well what it could
adequately deal within the time provided in Section
39-7-1 (although this not conceded). However, the solu-
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tion to this problem is in the law itself. The statute limits the right of the board to function through the period
between the 31st of .May and the 20th of .June each year
''except as otherwise provided.'' This proviso refers to
Section 59-5-46 ( 10), Utah Code Annotated, as amended
(1959), which grants the Utah State Tax Commission discretion to reconvene county boards of equalization whenever necessary. The evidence shows that the county
board did not request the Utah State Tax Commission
to exercise its power pursuant to this provision, and that
permission to reconvene was, therefore, not extended
( R. 189). The record offers no reason to suspect thn t
such a request would not have been honored, or indeed
that comparable request by any county board had ever
been denied. Therefore, any suggestions that the Commission would have been arbitrary or capricious in the
face of such a request must fail.
The clear weight of authority in America is to the
effect that a county board of equalization may function
only within the time limits prescribed by the controlling
language, and that these limits a.re jurisdictional. Sec
New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Sussex County Board of Equalization, 70 N.J.L. 186, 56 Atl. 138 (1903) ; State ex rel
Evans v. McGiwnis, 34 Ind. 452, Anno. 105 A.L.R. 624
(1936).
Not only does the ruling of the lo-wer court fail to
recognize that legislation in force explicitly provides a
completely adequate remedy for the problem described,
but it creates itself opportunity for com;iderable mischief. The only limitation (and this is inferential) set
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forth i11 the opm1on to the county commission's acting
as a board of equalization after June 20 is a requirement
that the board proceed with due diligence and reasonable dispatch (R. 146), with the board apparently the
judge of whether or not its diligence is due and its dispatch reasonable. The problems inherent in this type of
situation are manifest. Suppose, hypothetically, that a
buanl of equalization in a given county, acting under
poor advice or a mistake in law or even (and this is considerably less likely) bad faith would sit on an appeal or
a group of appeals until so late in the season that it is
prnctically impossible for the Commission to correct a
pate11tly erroneous or discriminatory determination made
l>y said board. If it is in the county board's power to
determine its own dispatch and diligence, and to make its
own evaluation as to whether attendant circumstances
justify an extension of hearing beyond the statutory
.June 20, this possibility is not remote.

The ruling of the lower court in legitimatizing this
kind of self-granted extension, based upon a board's own
determination of its inability to complete its assigned
task within the statutory period, with no provision for
l'C·\-iew of that extension, seems to have no counterpart
ill American jurisprudence. It seems patently at varinnce with the principle of law limiting powers of counties and component agencies to those specifically spelled
uut in statutory law, and Utah laws spelling out the sup2rvisory powers of the State Tax Commission. Fur!l1er, it seems to totally invalidate the third sentence of
St•ction 59-7-1, supra, which states that all complaints
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not disposed of on or prior to June 20 are deemed denied.
This type of repeal of legislative acts by judicial fiat
should not be upheld.
Let us now examine briefly Section 39-5-47. The lower
court has in effect held that this statute gives the state
one day to hold a hearing, listen to the complaint, assemble all pertinent data, make ·whatever investigation
it deems appropriate, make its determination, reduce
that determination to writing, and serve the same upon
the county auditor. It is concei;'able that the state's machinery might be able to do this in a single day in many
instances by considering one or even a Yery few properties, but as the record shows in this case there were approximately 700 properties to consider in a very few
days with pressures at least comparable to thosr
earlier on the county board; to have complied with the
procedure set forth aboYe would have perhaps taken
months (which in itself would have been a denial of
substantive justice).
It would, of course, have been an easy matter for the
state simply to have reestablished original values without making any effort to investigate complaints, study
material and data submitted, or attempt to be fair. 'I'hr
Commission chose not to take this easy way out, hut
rather made a bona fide effort toward equity and accuracy
(Tr. 122-123), as evidenced by the fact that 39.4 per ee11t
of the final assessments varied, howen•r slightly, from
the initial assessments.
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Rection 59-5-47 differs from Section 59-7-1 in two
significant aspects: (1) because of the inherent powers
of the sovereign state, it cannot be deemed jurisdictional;
(2) it contains no built-in solution to time pressures
which may arise, such as that relating to reconvening in
the case of the county.
There has been no contention, nor would the record
support one, to the effect that the taxpayers involved
here were in any way prejudiced by the few days involved
in the Commission's investigation and consideration of
the materials presented in the September hearings. On
the contrary, the evidence suggests that this delay could
only have ·worked to promote a proper and equitable re1·iew. We, therefore, respectfully suggest that a strict,
unyielding construction of Section 59-5-47, based upon
technical considerations extrinsic to its mis on d'etre is
not appropriate, and that the statute should be liberally
construed to implement its manifest purpose, which is to
insure uniformity and equality of valuation, assessment
and taxation.

It seems totally arbitrary, and clearly opposed to
the best interests of the state and its citizenry, to construe Section 59-7-1, supra, which contains in itself an
adequate solution to any problems involving time limitations and pressures, liberally to allow the county board
of equalization, which has 110 inherent authority, to in effect ignore many of its requirements, and at the same time
to strictly construe Section 59-5-47, supra, when this
statute contains no provisions for dealing with an ext raonli11ary workload, against a sovereign state.
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111 addition to the line of reasoning set forth above,
defendant respectfully submits that, since it sent to the
county auditor each day a notice of its action (i.e., that
it took under advisement the valuation questions before
it), that it did comply with the substance of Section
59-5-47.
In regard to the question of a supervisory officer sitting as a hearing officer, \Ve submit that since the record
shows that the official was a man of unusual knowledge
ann background, a recognized expert in ad valorem taxation (Tr. 150-155 ), and since he acted merely as an extension of the Commission in listening to complaints and
gathering information which he passed on to the Commission, and further since he participated in no way in the
Commission's ultimate decision-making process, it cannot be responsibly maintained that those property holders who appeared before this supervisory officer were in
any way prejudiced, or that they received either quantitatively or qualitatively any less consideration than
other taxpayers. Again, the substance of the statute was
complied with, and the lower court's ruling that these
particular hearings are void, in the total context of the
problem patently disregards the underlying purpose of
the statutory language (59-5-47, supra) and, therefore,
the decision should be reversed.
Even though the procedure adopted by the state in
its effort to correct the improper rulings of the Utah
County Board of Equalization followed generally the
procedures set forth in Section 59-5-47, supra, it should
be noted (and this was urged to the lower court) that
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they can be sustained under Section 59-5-46, supra, the
pertinent parts of which are set forth in Point I, and Section 59-7-13, supra.
Since ~ 59-5-46 details the Commission's duties and
responsibilities to supervise, advise, bring legal actions,
etr., to insure "that all assessments of property be made
just and equal, at true value, and that the tax burden
may be distributed without favor or discrimination"
(subsection 9) and then authorizes the Commission to
"exercise all powers necessary in the performance of
its duties" (suhseciton 23). We respectfully submit that
the Commission's action was proper even in the absence
of Section 59-5-47. There are no procedural problems
here, since the law is clear that "where a statute empowers a state board to equalize valuations for taxation
but does not point out the mode, any reasonable and
efficient mode may be adopted.'' 3 Cooley, Law of Taxation~ 1196 (1924). See South Spring Rainge & Cattle Co.
Y. Board of Equalization, 18 N.M. 531, 139 Pac. 159
(1914).
In relation to the procedure prescribed in Section
39-7-13, we submit that the Commission made the requisite investigation and finding. Under the circumstances,
an immediate raise to 20 per cent of fair cash value was
as near to the 30 per cent standard as could justly be
made. ·we respectfully submit that the Commission
dearly met the requirements of this statute, which gives
wide procedural latitude.

vVe thus respectfully urge that even if the court finds
the procedure requirements of Section 59-5-47 to be
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absoluh•ly inflexible and further fim1s that the State Tnx
Commission in its actions failed to adhere to these requirements, that its corrective actions are sustainable
under Seeton 59-5-47 and Section 59-7-13, or either of
tltPm, and should be, therefore, upheld.

POINT IV
THI~ LOvVER COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT THE AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM DEVISED AND IMPLE1\IENTED BY THE UTAH COUNTY BOARD
OF EQUALIZATION -w AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND VALUATIONS ARRIVED AT
B'/ USE OF THIS SYSTEM VOID. THE
COURT SHOULD HAVE FURTHER RULED
'l'HAT THE BOARD GENERALLY ABANDONED IN ITS DELIBERATIONS THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS OF UNIFORM
AND EQTJAL ASSESSMENT, AND ASSESSMENT BASED ON FAIR MARKET VALUE,
AND THAT THESE STANDARDS ARE
BINDING UPON COUNTY AND STATE TAX
OFFICIALS IN THE DIS CHARGE OF
THEIR YARIOUS DUTIES.

Tlw record shows that on July 10, 1968, the Utah
County Board of Equalization adopted a resolution relating to valuation of agricultural properties in this
mam1(•r:

''Commissioner Roberts movPd that the legitimate Class I agricultural land in an agricultural
zo11e be assessed at an appraised value of $500.00
pcr acre with other lands i11 nn agricultural zone
proratecl m·eording to class arnl also that agrieultural land not in a strictl~- agricultural zone
lint nsed for legitimate farming he valued at
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$650.00 per acre for Class I and with other lands
prorated according to class, seconded by Commissio11er Hinckley and passed unanimously.'' (R.
131-132).
The court held that this resolution was invalid, being
violative of constitutional standards, since it does not
purport to reflect market value, and that the adjusted
valuations based upon this classification were void. We
rc;,;pectfully suggest that the court was clearly correct in
this ruling, but that it would have been appropriate to
also rule that in its other deliberations as well the Board
failed to adhere to controlling constitutional mandates.
As pointed out in the intial brief of espondent, the
Utah Constitution (art. XIII, ~ 2 and 3) requires a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and
that all properties be assessed according to fair market
or fair cash value. These two tests are complementary
and interlocking, si11ce it is axiomatic that equality and
uniformity in assessment and taxation can only be obtained if a common standard is employed for all properties.
The relief desired in this particular by respondent is
a clear declaration that county tax officials, as well as
state officials, are bound absolutely by the constitutional
ancl statutory requirements of uniformity and equality
of taxation and taxation based upon 30 per cent of fair
cash value. Since this action is a declaratory judgment
action, such a pronouncement by this honorable court
would have no executory ramifications and would require
no tax refunds, additional payments, recomputations or
2!1

other disrnpti,-e or time-consuming ads, but would lrnn
a completely salutory impact upon future assessments
and taxation procedures. All officials would be chargc<1
with awareness and in fact aware that they have no option to deviate from constitutional requirements, or substitute at their pleasure other standards or considerations for those set forth in controlling constitutional and
statutory la\v.
Appellants, in their brief, explore at length collateral problems in relation to this agricultural classification, pointing out the limited number of properties, the
good faith of the Board, etc., and so on, but do not co11front the basic question, which is whether or not agricult nrnl classification was permitted under the Constitution
and statutes controlling at the time the controversy
arose. It should be noted that these agricultural classifications were made without regard to what the value of
the land itself might be when utilized for purposes other
than agriculture. Indeed, this is the very basis of the
classification concept, that one does not consider fair
market value, i.e., what a piece of land ·would bring in the
open market, but merely considers what the property is
worth used in a particular way. For example, if a classification law were passed holding that land used for
grazing purposes in Utah would be Yalued at only $400
an acre for ad valorem tax purposes, someone could conceivahly purchase the land on which the Salt Palace is
being huilt (zoning problems aside), convert it to pastur0 for a large grey goat thPre kept tethered, and pay
taxes on this prime realty, which would bring thousands
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in the open market, on the basis of its classified value
rather than its actual value. This illustration is admittedly ad absurdum, hut it does point out the nature of the
problem.
Courts have uniformly held that where a constiiut ion requires uniform assessment and taxation according to a given standard of value that classification is
unconstitutional. For instance, in Real Foot Lake Levee
District v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 36 S.W. 1041, 34 L.R.A.
725 (1896) a plan to impose a simple tax of X dollars per
aere on land was struck down because the true value re'luirement necessarily implies different tax on different
lands since common sense suggests all would not have
equal market value. In Atlantic & N. C.R. Co. v. Cartaret County Comm'rs, 75 N. C. 474 (1876) a law which
provided that certain classes of property should not be
valued for tax purposes below a specified sum was in\'alidated as violative of the market standard. Many other eases have simply held where constitution requires
taxation of prnperty in proportion to its value neither the
legislature nor administrative officials may divide prop<'rty into classes and place a specified value on each,
whether or not such classifications are arbitrary or based
upon a conscientious effort to determine average or median or typical values of properties. See, for example,
Hawkins v. Mangam, 78 Miss. 97, 28 So. 872 (1900);
T1i1 ely v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co., 102 Tex. 545, 120 S.W.
'3;)2 (1909); Mahoney v. City of San Diego, 245 Pac. 189
(Cal. 1926) ; Fruit growers Express Co. v. Brett, 94 Mont.
281, 22 P.2d 171 (1933).
1
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There is a Utah decision which conside1·ec1 the CJUCi-ition of chu::sification of property for tax puqrnses. After
recognizing the general rule that all presumptions must
be exercised in favor of constitutionality of a statute, it
still struck clown a classification statute as being repugnant to Utah Const. art. XIII, ~·~ 2 and 3. There is curious dicta in the case which suggests that classifica tio11
per se might not be precluded in this jurisdiction so long
as all classes are taxed at the same rate, but discrimi11ation is very purpose of classification. Stillrnan v.
Lyuch, 56 Utah 540, 192 Pac. 272, 12 A.L.R. 552 (1920).
More significant in this context even though older is
State ex rel Cunningham v. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 50 Pac.
615 ( 1897). The court held:
All taxable property within this state must be assessed and taxed and valuation fixed at its actual
cash value or as near such value as is reasonably
prnctica1.
There follows a fairly comprehensin listing of
the cases dealing with the question of "Thether or not agricultural lands may be assessed at different rates than
landR used for other purposes. Both Cooley and the
American Law Report Annotations summary (111
A.L.R. 1486) (1937) state that the better and general
rnk is that Rtl<'h classification ,-iolates constitutional re(:nin•ments of uniform assessment "since such land may
hP worth more than its value as agricultural land." 1
Cooley, Law of Taxation ~ 158 (1924). Consistent with
thiR rule an• the following: JJ1 onaglzan v. Lewis, 5 Pa. 218,
::i9 At!. 948, JO )um. CaseR 1048 (190.J); Smith v. Americus, 89 Gn. 810, 15 S.E. 752 (1892); Cary v. Rebrn, 88
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111. 154, 30 Am. Rep. 543 (1878); Shuck v. Lebanon, 197
Ky. 232, 53 S.W. 635 (1899); Opinion of Justices, 97 Me.
:i~J7, 55 Atl. 827 (1903); Zanesville v. Richards, 59 Ohio
St. 589 (1855); Saltonstall v. Board of Review of Cheboy.r;an, 1.'32 Mich. 196, 93 N.E. 154 (1903); Custer County v.
8t. Louis S. F. Ry. Co., 207 P.2d 774 (Okla. 1949), (this
case is unusual in that an attempt was made to discriminate against rural properties); State Tax Comm'n
v. JV akefield, 161 Atl. 2d 676 (Md. 1960); Boyne v. State,
80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 225 (1964); Board of County
('umm'rs of Canadian County v. State Board of Equalization and eleven sister cases, 363 P.2d 242, et seq. (Okla.
1964).
The Maine and Nevada cases contain particularly
interesting language.
There is a line of Missouri cases, some before and
some after a constitutional amendment. The later ones,
with controlling constitutional language not dissimilar to
our own, belong in the line above-quoted. See, for example, Griswold v. O'Brien, 89 Mo. 631, 1 S.W. 763
(1886).
South Dakota also has a before-and-after line of
cases. Prior to the constitutional amendment, when uniformity of assessment and taxation were required, the
cases were consistent with those above listed. Simmons
v. Erickson, 54 S.D. 429, 223 N.W. 324 (1929); Chicago
R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Monaghan, 54 S.D. 432, 223 N.W.
:344 (1929). After an ameudment which permitted clasHification, a contrary result followed. See Great North33

em R. R. Co. v. TYhitjield, 65 S.D. 173, 272 N:W. 781
(1937).

Iu Hamilton v. Fort TVayne, 40 Ind. 491 (1872), the
philosophy of the above cases was recognized but a defect in the statutory language in question necessitated
a contrary decision.
Cases permitting classification but doing so based
upon permissive constitutional language at variance
with our own include the following: Leicht v. Burlingto11,
73 Iowa 29, 34 N.W.494 (1887); Daly v. Morgan, 60 Mrl.
460, 1G Atl. 287, 1 L.R.A. 757 (1888); Dickinson "·
Porter, 35 N.W.2d 66 (Okla. 1948) overruled prior decision 31 N.W.2d 110); Switz Y. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566,
182 Atl.2d 841 (1962).
In State ex rel Lyman v. Stewart, 58 Mont. 1, 190
Pac. 129 ( 1920) a tax was upheld which was laid solely
upon agricultural properties. Considerations not here
present were determinative.
The antiquity of some of these cases illustrates the
fact that this problem is, like the poor, ever with ns.
In connection "·ith this problem, it should be noted
that on N oyember 5th last preceding the electorate of
this state amended the constitution to provide that agricultural lands might be assessed according to a classified Yalue; i.e., the value of such lands would have as
farm l::rnd:,;, rather than at their fair market value. A
number of observations should be made in relation to

this action of the electorate, the most obvious being that
if it was necessary to pass a constitutional amendment to
permit agricultural classification, then such classification was not permissible prior to the time the amendment
was passed.
The contention might be made that the passage
of this enactment rendered moot this point of the lawsuit. We would respectfully suggest that such contention must fail for the following reasons:
(1) Whatever the law might become in the future,

thr action arose when there was no basis for classification in either constitutional or statutory law.
( 2) The provision passed by the electorate is pennissice and does not in itself change the law, but merely
entitles the legislature to promulgate whatever law it
sees fit. The legislature has not yet promulgated such
a law. It is not certain what form of law it will promulgate, if any, and the situation is therefore like that
found in Southern Pacific Co. v. Cochise County, 92 Ariz.
305, 377 P.2d 770 (1963), where the constitution permitted classification, but the legislature had not enacted implementing legislation and therefore property classification for purposes of assessment and taxation was not
(and in Utah, at the time of this writing, is not) permissible.
(3) The constitutional amendment would permit the
legislature of the state to classify agricultural properties
for tax purposes, but nothing therein can be construed
to give this power to county commissions.
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( 4) Most significantly, the basic problem of classification, explicit or implicit, creating a variance from the
constitutional standard of fair market value, remains
with us. Even if the legislature does implement the
agricultural classification amendment, the same problem could arise when state or local taxing authorities
attempt to classify property on the basis of use in industry or mining, or ownership by widows or veterans, or
any of a hundred of the conceivable grounds.
Although the illegal agricultural classification attempte<l by the Utah County Commission was a flagrant
violation of the constitution and the inherent powers, it
is only a single facet of the total abandonment by thesr
officials of the constitutional directives in their equalization proceedings. We would respectfully suggest that
there is a total dearth of evidence in the record to support the court's finding (R. 189) that the County Boanl
attempted to adhere to the requirements of the constitution or that it based its deliberations on sales data
or other relevant information.
-While the record is clear that the Utah County
Board of Equalization completely abandoned the constitutional fair market Yalue, it is not clear as to what
standards were adopted. It would seem that the Board
iiroc0eckd in an irregular aml unsystematic manner,
relying on all manner of extralegal aml extra technical
factors, such as pre-existing valuations of a decade's
vintage and the personalities and economic situations of
those appearing before it. The degree of the Board's
rleparture from a11y realistic attempt at 'rnluation i:-;
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illustrated vividly by reference to Defendant's Exhibit
No. 4. This exhibit shows the original values arrived
;it hy the state appraisal teams, and their subsequent fate.
A simple computation from this exhibit reveals the
following: In relation to 328 of the 716 parcels about
which full information is available in the exhibit, or in
15.8 per cent of the cases, the county board reduced
the assessment to less than half of that determined by
appraisal, in most of these instances to substantially less
tha11 half, and in some cases ( ex.-E-384-A, E-497-1,
E-587-D, E-739, E-750-1-1, F-468, F-1495-18-A, G-647,
G-1408, G-2107) the reduction was over 80 per cent. In
116 instances, or 16.2 per cent of the total, the board
simply halved to the nearest dollar the assessment before it, and in 63 additional instances, or 8.8 per cent of
the total, dropped the assessment to slightly above half
of the original. In only 209 cases, or 29.2 per cent of
tlw parcels, was the board's adjusted valuation less extreme, and in most of these instances it represented reductions of 20 - 30 per cent of the original assessment. 3

\Vhile we submit that there is more than sufficient
admitted evidence in the record to show that abandonment and deviation by the County Board, the proffered
testimony of Augustus B. C..Johns, Jr., a recognized
expert in the appraisal field (Tr. 272-273) should remove
the last vestige of doubt.
3 To cite just one particularly telling s~eci~c e.xample of t~e criteri.a
Jnd processes utilized bv the Board of Equahzat10n 1s the Boards determ1n.ttion that assessed vai"uation or the land of the Riverside Country Club
was j;J 00 per acre I (Pl. Exh. 8, p. 54-55)
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Prior to 1\Ir. J olms' proffered testimony, another
proffer was made (after the court refused to admit testimony as actual evidence). Commissioner G. Mario11
Hinckll'y, oue of the plaintiffs, testified in this proffer
that pursuant to agreement with Governor Calvin L.
Rampton he and his fell ow commissioners selected certain properties among the subject properties of this action for an independent appraisal to determine whether
or not the appraisal conducted by the Utah State Tax
Commission was accurate. Mr. Hinckley further testified
that they selected not average properties but properties
which he and his fellow commissioners thought were particnlarly out of line. ( Tr. 271) Pursuant to this agreement, ::\Ir. Johns was retained by the Governor.
1\f r. Johns' proffer shows that his testimony would
have been that his independent appraisal of these properties, conducted according to expert methods, and without knowledge of the valuations placed upon these properties by either the state or the county, resulted in value
determinations strikingly close to those of the state, well
within the degree of variance usually found in the profession, and way out of line with, and sometimes even
a multiple of, the valuation figures finally adopted by the
county. Appraisal is not an exact thing, and some variance is always present, but competent appraisers will
rn ry little (usually within 5 per cent) of their final conclusions.
J olms would have also testified, based upon his
personal knowledge of the real estate market in the area
and direct investigation of over one hundred parcels pur~Ir.
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suant to his employment by the Governor, that in recent
yt>ars Orem and Provo property values on the type of
land valued by the county pursuant to classification at
$SOO and $650 per acre have been fairly level as here
indicated:

Area
Price Per Acre Range
Northeast Provo ________________
$5,000 to $6,000
Orem (General) -----------------$2,000 to $3,000
Orem (West Side)-------------$1,200 to $3,000

He would have testified further in relation to particular
properties, the most interesting of which was located immediately adjacent to the golf course, valued by the Board
at $500 per acre. His testimony would have shown that
in .May of last year a purchase was made by a Warren
J\I urphy of fifteen acres of such land at an average price
of $5,300 per acre.
Mr. Johns would have additionally testified that, in
!tis opinion, it would not have been possible for the
valuations placed by the county upon the golf course and
the other properties he examined, to be arrived at
through the use of any accepted appraisal techniques or
procedures. He would have testified similarly that the
$500-$650 value range placed upon agricultural lands
through the classification bears no relationship and has
no reference whatsoever to the actual values of the lands
COl1CPrned.
The entirety of }fr. Johns' proffer (Tr. 280-288) is
1wommended to the court for its perusal. These statements assume additional weight when considered in the
frame of reference of his exceptional background, experience, and qualifications, which were summarized by
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him to the proffer, and his reputatiou among his peers,
whirh is equally imposing.
\Ve respectfully suggest that the court erred in exeln<liug this testimony and that it ·was obviously probative, particularly when the whole chronology in the matter is considered. The trial court expressed concern when
making its exclusion that allo\ving Mr. J olms to testify might lead to a "parade of experts" coming to the
stand with confusing and co11tradictory testimony. \Ye
would respectfully submit that it would not have been
possible, for obvious reasons, for plaintiffs to secnre an
expert witness with anything resembling l\Ir. J oh11s'
stature, to def end the County Board's figures as tending
to reflcet market value. These figures are so far out of
line with th0 actual market values that no reputable
appraiser would have supported the Board's actions if
he had rpgarcl for his professional reputation. If the
plaintiff did perchance offer a rebutting expert, the court
could easily han weighed the testimony of both.
\Ve respectfully suggest that much of the testimony
of l\Tr. Johns merely affirms and underscores evidence
otht•rwise in the rerord, and some of it is of so obviously
t rne and g0n0rall>· accepted as true, that the court cou]cl
well take> judicial notice of it. ·while we believe that
the lmver court clearly erred in excluding this testimo11y and that this court should consider the same i11 its
final dPtcrmi11ation, it is not the desire of any of the parties 1hat the case lw rcrnnnclecl for additional evidence,
i11 Yit'\\' of the aente time pressures mid the public sig-ll ifiea ll('e of Ow e011 tro\·ersy.
\Ye would suggest that
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without Mr. Johns' tesfonony the record clearly
supports respondent's contentions that the County Board
of gqualization did abandon the constitutional and statutory test of equal and uniform valuation according to fair
market value, both generally and specific-ally (in its
a<1option of an agricultural elassification), and that the
conrt can so find from the record as it now exists.
pn11

Appellants dwell at length on the fact that the County Board of Equalization exercised its powers in 700 of
the 1,200 cases that it considered and refused to grant
any relief in the other 500. An examination of the
county minutes, however, "'ill show that in many instances when the county refused to grant requested adjustments, the requests involved buildings or lands not
part of those which were recently revalued in connection
with the state's appraisal program, and that the County
Board typically granted relief, usually (as will be pointed
out below) extensiYe relief, when petitioned in relation
to land in Proyo and Orem. In fact, the record clearly
c•vidences total abandonment in most instances by the
Board of the constitutional and statutory standards of
fair market value when dealing with this land.
The description on Pages 23 and 24 of appellants'
bri<•f of the concern about the agricultural classification and similar problems as "diversionary tactics
rnneeived after the fact'' is completely without merit.
Indeed, the record clearly shows that these deviations
we>re the sine qua non of the entire action - but for these
d0,·iations there would have been no request for cooperation and restoration of the original values, no interven-
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tion, no lawsuit. We also suggest that careful cxamina
tion of the pleadings, pretrial order and the remaining
parts of the record will show that these issues were pro1iC'rly before the lower court and are properly before thi~
court 011 appeal.

Also lacking in merit is the inference that the fact
that State Tax Commission personnel sat with the Comtty Board of Equalization during the 1967 hearings somehow sanctions the Board's actions. The record clearly
shows (Tr. 204-205) that these personnel were instructed
only to offer technical assistance and to attempt no snlistaiit i w intervention into the Board's deliberations. Cmttroversy arose soon after these hearings, indeed during
the latter part of them, and the suggestion that these persormel "did not communicate ... to the Commissioners" '
... their "feeling of impropriety" is note"worthy to say
the least.
·we respectfully further suggest that the argument
a<lvanced in the first full paragraph on Page 25 of appellants' brief is not only of questionable merit but actually harmful to appellants' position. If the lower cou1i cannot dcclar<:> void in this type of an action assessment~
hased upon an illegal agricultural classification, it then
follows a fort£ori that the court cannot declare void, as
it did at the instigation and urging of appellants, 16,300
assessments which had been accepted and acquiesced i11
hy all affect<:>d parties (stat<:> officials, local officials and
taxpayPrs) and which were the basis of the actual taxes,
Hever protested, paid during the year 1967 on these prop<'rties. 'I'his argument is a Pandora's hox, which

"-c
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anticipated appellants would avoid like a contagious disPase, since it is totally inconsistent with their contention
in relation to the reappraisals. It appears to be tang<>nial to the central issues of the cases, and of dubious
rnliclity, hut we liave no objection to the court's consid(•ration of it, since such consideration can only work to
t lw ]Jeuefit of respondent.
Counsel for appellants emphasized in his argument
before the lower court, and again in his brief before this
l10norable court, the good intentions and miscellaneous
bona fides of the County Board of Equalization. Respondl'llt has not addressed itself extensively, either below
or before this court, to these intentions, feeling that
,,,Jiether or not the County Board acted in good faith is
uot really relevant. If it used wrong valuation standards and made illegal adjustments in good faith, the
stn te 's right to correct these errors is just as solidly
present as it would be had the abandonment of the constitutional standard and erroneous adjustments resulted
from bad advice, gross negligence or even deliberate
maliciousness. As stated in a leading Arizona case:
There is no indication of any dishonest motives
on the part of any of these officials. We are satisfied there were none but if the result of these
intentional acts is discrimination the assessments
cannot stand irrespective of motives. Sparks v.
McCluskey, 84 Ariz. 283, 327 P.2d 295 (1958).

It should be noted, that even though respondent has
not ehallenged (and does not now formally challenge)

lhe good faith of appellants, such good faith is not all

that obvious from the record. The lack of cooperation
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Pvid<•11cc•d h>· appellants from the lwgi1ming; the incrPclible dcYiati011 from the \'aluations arrin~d at by state appraisers using the most current a rnl generally accepted
appraisal teelmiques; the nrnh to get the ,-aluations bat-wd
11po11 the county adjustments out; the refusal of appellants to cooperate with or accommodate the Commission
in a11>- way in its efforts to work out an interim solution
io the problem which '''onld make possible the ultimate
collectio11 of whatever tax was finally determined to ht>
appropriate (such collection now being unfeasible 110
matter who wins); the making of certain representations
at the hearing before this court on a motion for extraorcli11ary relief at the outset of the litigation; and the chn•lling on arguments about pressures of time and spacr•
1l'li icli arose aft er the inception of tli e cont racers y ( 1-:ec
appellants' ]Jrief, pp. 20-21), suggest that the appellants'
primary intc•re;;;t during the time immediately preceding
and follo-wi11g the filing of this action was not to work
out the problem in the best interests of all concerned in
an open and cooperative manner, but rather to colled
taxes based upon their own Yaluations in such a way as
to make most difficult any recouping of aclcli tional monie.~
slwuhl the ultimate issue be resolved in the state's fayor.
Illustrative of this attitrnle is the frivolous testimou:r
of the Utah County Auditor (Tr. 4G) to the effect that
only t\\-o persous could work on the assc>ssment roll hooks
at a time, when the physical eYiclence (Plaintiffs' Exh.
!l) pr0se11terl sho\\-s that the pages of this book are of a
looselen f na tun• an cl could be remoYecl at "·ill. \V <' will
extend this diseussion no fnrtlwr, ho\Yever, because the
good faith or lack thereof of a11~- of the appellants or, in

ileed of any persons herein inYolved, is not of cardinal
~igHificance. What is important is whether or not actioJJs taken ·were consiste11t with constitutional a11d statutory standards, and whether such actions represented
propPr exercises of delegated powers. Plaintiffs' posture
of wounded innocence does seem, however, somewhat inenng ruous.
The power of the State Tax Commission to correct
rnluations within a county determined by it to be e1To11cous is clear (see Point I) and not depernlent upon
hatl faith, gross deviation from the norm, requests for
a<ljustment, or any other extraneous circumstances.
'We therefore urge this honorable court to:
( 1) Affirm the decision of the lower court in relation
to the agricultural classification system;

(2) Specifically rule that county, as well as state,
l)ffir:ials are bound by the constitutional standards of uniform and equal assessment and taxation and assessment
according to fair market value in exercising assessment
aJtd equalization powers, and that the Utah County Board
of gqualization in 1967 deviated from these standards.
POINT V
TH:BJ SOLUTION PROPOSED BY APPELLANTS DOES NOT SOLVE, NOR DOES THE
OFFERED DISPOSITION DISPOSE OF, THE
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF ASSESSMENT INEQUALITY, AND SHOULD BE REJECTED IN FAVOR OF A BROADER, MORE
R:B~ASONABLE RESOLUTION WHICH IS
CONSISTENT vVITH CONTROLLING LAW
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J.ND \VHICH WOULD LAY THE BASIC
PROBLE"'.\1 TO REST BY -WORKING EQUITY
THROUGHOUT THE STATE.
If there is one aspect of this case about which all
parties are in agreement, it is that there is at the present
time considerable inequity in ad valorem taxation in
the state of Utah. Disparity exists within classes of
property, between classes of property and between different parts of the state geographically. In general,
taxes are highest on personality and utility properties
and lowest on rural agricultural realty. It is apparent
that action needs to be taken to eliminate, in the interests of equality and adherence to law, these discrepancies. The only viable program in the state which is working toward solution of these problems, that of the Utah '
State Tax Commission, was dealt a serious blow in the
lower court when the cyclical reappraisal program conducted pursuant to Section 59-5-46.1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was found (erroneously, we respectfully suggest) defective in implementation and valuations made
thereunder voided.

Appellants urge upholding of this ruling, but offer no
meaningful program of their own to solve the Utah County problem. The inference is that the inequality should
lie allowed to exist indefinitely, and indeed worsen, until
some unspecified time in the great blue beyond when the
Commission is able to offer a "plan" meeting certain
imidentifiPd criteria which would soh'e the problem, prcfurnbly c·orn·eJ1trati11g elsewhere than in Utah County.
']'his is no solution at all; if adopted, the perpetuation of
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1·xi8ting problems will be assured. Some residents are
shouldering substantially more than their share of the
lrnnle11, and there is little to be said for continuing this
condition any longer than necessary. Further, there are
~Hlclitional lawsuits already filed, as pointed out in respo11dent 's initial brief, and if the basic problem is not
now solved a multiplicity of litigation is more than a remote possibility. We would respectfully suggest, for the
reasons set forth in the initial brief, that the part of the
lo\\'l'r court's decree voiding the appraisal program and
rnluations arrived at thereunder be reversed, or, in the
alternative, that this court by its edict require state-wide
uniformity within a given time (see Point IV, initial
l1ricf).
This last approach appears particularly attractive
\\'hen the alternatives are considered:
(1) Sustaining the lower court's ruling as to the

inYalidity of the assessments in question, which could
only make a bad situation worse by destroying the only
(dfoetive program now working towards uniformity and
equality, and giving local officials a carte blanche to ignore the controlling law and continue to engage in which
.:'llr. Morrill referred to as "competitive undervaluation'' ;4 and
(2) Simply reversing the lower court's declaration
in i11validity, which would allow the State Tax Commission to proceed with due diligence in its systematic statewide reassessment program. The effectiveness of this
~-

4 Monill, Denis R,, Property Tax Assessment and the Utah Constitution
A Taxpaver's Dilemma, supra,
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remetly would depend to a great deal on the legislatm1·
making sufficient funds available to permit an effoctin
attack on the problem (there is considerable grounds for
optimism here) and upon the effecti,-e, cooperative effort
of lo<'al officials (there is less cause for encouragement iu
this particular, because of the limitatio11s in monies and
teclrnirally trained personnel in the eounties - particularly the smaller ones - and because of pressures to keep
assessments down).

CONCLUSIOX
Dl'foudant is painfully cognizant that the court is
being presented with a rather large bundle for its consideration. The record is long and somewhat cluttered,
the briefs extensin, the issues complex. \Ve are equally
cognizant, however, that these issues are of the highest
public importance, and are reluctant to jeopardize their
full and thorough consideration through a mechanical
effort to shorten the record or simply the argument. WP
have, ho·wev0r, maue an effort to focus the attention of
the court on the most significant problems here presented.
The difficulties connected with the case are further
compounded hy the difference in emphasis placed upon
the facts (in relation to which there is nry little basic
disagreement) by respeetin counsel since the iuitiatiou
of the lawsuit.
\Ye submit that controlli11g law clearly provides that
the State Tax Commission has supen-isory power ovrr
county officials in all valuatiou, asscssmeut and taxatiou
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fuuctions, including the power to adjust assessments
1Cif hin a county; that county boards of equalization are
hnmtd in their deliberations by constitutional and statuton' standards of fair cash value and uniformity and
<'q nality of taxation, and may not classify properties in an
effort to defeat these standards; that the Utah County
Board of Equalization in its 1967 sittings deviated in a
large degree from these standards and from the procedural requirements set forth in Section 59-7-1; that
the Commission, in its subsequent reassessments acted
in accorua11ce with law; that those statutes which define the Commission's powers and set forth the procedures for exercising this power should be liberally interpreted to effectuate the legislative intent of insuring just,
fair and uniform taxation; that the systematic statewide
n~assessment program of the Commission, working toward uniformity and equality, should be sustained and
''alnations arrived at through this program validated
aml upheld or, in the alternative, that this honorable
court should order uniform compliance throughout the
s1 ate with the constitutional and statutory provisions
prescribing uniform and equal taxation of all properties based upon fair cash value. The lower court recognized many of these propositions; insofar, however, as
it8 decision deviated therefrom, ·we respectfully submit
1lint its ruling should be modified.
rrhis case can, and we respectfully submit should,
li1• considered from two vantage points:
( l) As a specific controversy which arose in 1967 beh1er11 two levels of government;
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(2) As a problem of widespread assessment inequality, of grc>at magnitude and duration, of which the precipitating controversy is only a small part.

1

We realize that a case in which an appellate conrt
properly looks beyond the specific parties involved, and '
the transactions between them, in its deliberations i~
somewhat out of the ordinary. This is, howeYer, such a
case. We respectfully urge this honorable court to exercise its powers to effect a full and meaningful solution.
Respectfully submitted,
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